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The views expressed in this article are those of the author in an academic researcher [1] capacity and as a former practitioner in international cooperation on law enforcement. They do not reflect the official position of any Romanian governmental institution or authorities. Additionally, the research and perspectives provided pertain to areas no longer under the author’s responsibility, and any conclusions drawn are based solely on the author’s independent analysis of the subject matter.
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Following Brexit, the once (in)famous phrase “Fog In Channel, Continent Cut Off,” long associated with British Euroscepticism, took on a new meaning, reflecting the departure of UK law enforcement from most of the EU’s judicial and police cooperation frameworks. While this separation impacts, albeit at different levels, both sides of the English Channel, it has not confined issues such as serious organised crime, modern slavery / human trafficking (MSHT), cybercrime, or illegal migration to Europe alone; these challenges remain shared.
Since the UK voted to leave the European Union, there has been a constant stream of analysis focused on the impact of that decision—particularly regarding security and policing. Most of the early discussions revolved around the fear of a “No Deal” Brexit, a scenario that would have left the UK with no formal agreements in place for cooperation with EU law enforcement agencies (Dawson, 2020; Eurojust, 2021; Home Office, 2019). Experts, academics, and law enforcement officials were largely in agreement: cutting off the UK from EU legal frameworks and cross-border cooperation tools would significantly hinder efforts to combat organized crime, including MSHT, illegal migration and even terrorism (Carrapico et al., 2019; Sweeney & Winn, 2021).
Though the feared “No Deal” scenario was evaded with the signing of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which set the stage for continued law enforcement collaboration, many experts believe the new arrangements fall short of the seamless cooperation that existed before Brexit (Furgała, 2021; Townsend, 2020).
From the perspective of practitioners on both sides of the Channel, one of the most critical losses was the access to the Schengen Information System II (SIS II), which the UK used over 600 million times in 2019 alone to track criminals and threats across Europe (Horten, 2020; Townsend, 2020). Without SIS II, UK police can no longer instantly check if suspects are wanted in EU member states, relying instead on Interpol’s less comprehensive system (UK Parliament, 2020b).
Furthermore, the loss of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) has also complicated cross-border policing efforts. Between 2009 and 2019, the UK processed over 105,000 extradition requests through the EAW, enabling the swift arrest of fugitives (Dawson, 2020). Now, the UK must rely on the 1957 European Convention on Extradition (UK Parliament, 2020a) and the provisions within the TCA, which offer an expedited process. However, these alternatives do not match the efficiency and advantages of the EAW.
Similarly, leaving Europol has hindered intelligence sharing. Previously, the UK exchanged thousands of reports and coordinated operations targeting serious crime through Europol and its SIENA platform. Post-Brexit, the UK has reduced access, relying on slower channels to gather and share crucial information (NCA, 2020).
Without direct access to these tools, UK authorities depend on other alternatives, such as Interpol’s systems, which may lead to operational delays. Bilateral agreements may fill some of the gaps, but the existing frameworks from prior to the expansion of the EU are outdated or no longer relevant. As transitional cooperation measures phased out at the end of 2022, the full consequences of the UK’s departure from the EU judicial framework remain uncertain.
An early analysis[1] of the data exchanges between the UK and Romania through various channels indicates a noticeable decline in cooperation. The impact of Brexit on the collaboration between the UK and Romania in terms of law enforcement is even more significant, particularly in addressing transnational crimes such as MSHT. Romanian nationals have been consistently prominent in crime statistics in the UK and identified as a substantial proportion of MSHT victims, underscoring the importance of bilateral cooperation, which both national instruments and EU frameworks have traditionally facilitated. While Europol and SIENA channels have continued to support MSHT-related data exchange throughout the transitional period, the overall volume has lessened, and direct bilateral cooperation through national focal points has also decreased substantially.
As the post-Brexit landscape continues to take shape, there remains a pressing need to assess the level of cooperation between EU Member States and the UK. While the above-mentioned analysis is based on a limited data set regarding bilateral cooperation between the UK and a specific EU member state, it supports the concerns that the UK’s exit from EU security frameworks could significantly disrupt police cooperation efforts. However, factors like the reduced level of police enforcement during the Covid pandemic could also play a role. More detailed data on convictions and qualitative insights from stakeholders could help clarify the situation. While the bilateral political commitment to collaboration between the two jurisdictions has been reaffirmed through a Joint Action Plan on MSHT[2], concrete data exchange and cooperation agreements will likely be needed to restore the level of efficiency seen before Brexit.
The UK’s reliance on EU instruments for addressing security threats has long been tied to both the challenges confronting Europe and the growing population of EU residents within the UK. Post-Brexit, the security risks that continue to affect Europe are unlikely to bypass the UK. Furthermore, with an estimated 6 million EU residents remaining in the country, the likelihood of increased family reunifications and potentially illegal immigration may add to the complexity of existing threats. The primary shift seems to be in the capacity of the UK and the EU to collaborate effectively in mitigating these threats. In parallel, the abolition of free movement for EU nationals and the shift toward stricter immigration rules will likely exacerbate MSHT and increase vulnerabilities.
The EU also stands to lose, particularly in its ability to track and return fugitives residing in the UK. The need for new bilateral agreements or targeted measures has become increasingly apparent. Post-Brexit, much of the mutual trust and shared standards that previously defined EU-UK cooperation must be replaced by new forms of collaboration based on shared interests. Regardless of political perspectives, the importance of cross-border cooperation in addressing organised crime and protecting vulnerable communities remains a shared concern for both the UK and the EU.
[1] Based on data from the Romanian National Police (RNP) for the period 2013-2022 obtained via the Romanian Freedom of Information Act no 544/2001 https://www.politiaromana.ro/ro/legislatie/responsabil-legea-544
[2] UK and Romania pledge to tackle human trafficking – https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-romania-pledge-to-tackle-human-trafficking
Carrapico, H., Niehuss, A. & Berthélémy, C. (2019) *Brexit and Internal Security*.
Dawson, J. (2020) *Brexit next steps: The European Arrest Warrant*. UK Parliament.
Eurojust (2021) *Judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the European Union and the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021*.
Furgała, A. (2021) *Police cooperation of Poland and Great Britain in scope of Brexit*.
Home Office (2019) *Extradition Provisional Arrest Power Impact Assessment (IA)*.
Horten, M. (2020) *Border safety will be at risk if the UK loses access to vital EU databases*. LSE Brexit Blog.
National Crime Agency (NCA) (2020) *Future Security Cooperation*.
Sweeney, S. & Winn, N. (2021) *Do or die? The UK, the EU, and internal/external security cooperation after Brexit*. *European Political Science*, 21, 237–254.
Townsend, M. (2020) *The Brexit deal is done – but many crucial issues are unresolved*. *The Guardian*.
UK Parliament (2020a) *Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Bill 2019-2021*.
UK Parliament (2020b) *Post-Brexit police co-operation*.
[1] https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/beacons-of-excellence/rights-lab/our-team/robert-marin/index.aspx